Evolutionarily stable payoff matrix in hawk–dove games
Classical matrix game models aim to find the endpoint of behavioural evolution for a set of fixed possible interaction outcomes. Here, we introduce an evolutionary model in which not only the players’ strategies but also the payoff matrix evolves according to natural selection.
Elmentve itt :
| Szerzők: | |
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| Dokumentumtípus: | Cikk |
| Megjelent: |
2024
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| Sorozat: | BMC ECOLOGY AND EVOLUTION
24 No. 1 |
| Tárgyszavak: | |
| doi: | 10.1186/s12862-024-02257-8 |
| mtmt: | 34864285 |
| Online Access: | http://publicatio.bibl.u-szeged.hu/33523 |
| Tartalmi kivonat: | Classical matrix game models aim to find the endpoint of behavioural evolution for a set of fixed possible interaction outcomes. Here, we introduce an evolutionary model in which not only the players’ strategies but also the payoff matrix evolves according to natural selection. |
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| Terjedelem/Fizikai jellemzők: | 8 |
| ISSN: | 2730-7182 |