The ESS and replicator equation in matrix games under time constraints
Recently, we introduced the class of matrix games under time constraints and characterized the concept of (monomorphic) evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in them. We are now interested in how the ESS is related to the existence and stability of equilibria for polymorphic populations. We point out...
Elmentve itt :
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| Dokumentumtípus: | Cikk |
| Megjelent: |
2018
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| Sorozat: | JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY
76 No. 7 |
| Tárgyszavak: | |
| doi: | 10.1007/s00285-018-1207-0 |
| mtmt: | 3365687 |
| Online Access: | http://publicatio.bibl.u-szeged.hu/33522 |
| Tartalmi kivonat: | Recently, we introduced the class of matrix games under time constraints and characterized the concept of (monomorphic) evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in them. We are now interested in how the ESS is related to the existence and stability of equilibria for polymorphic populations. We point out that, although the ESS may no longer be a polymorphic equilibrium, there is a connection between them. Specifically, the polymorphic state at which the average strategy of the active individuals in the population is equal to the ESS is an equilibrium of the polymorphic model. Moreover, in the case when there are only two pure strategies, a polymorphic equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable under the replicator equation for the pure-strategy polymorphic model if and only if it corresponds to an ESS. Finally, we prove that a strict Nash equilibrium is a pure-strategy ESS that is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of the replicator equation in n-strategy time-constrained matrix games. |
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| Terjedelem/Fizikai jellemzők: | 1951-1973 |
| ISSN: | 0303-6812 |