Jugoszlávia elleni szovjet katonai támadás lehetősége a brit források tükrében, 1948-1953

Although the hypothetical possibility of Soviet and/or satellite military attack against Yugoslavia first emerged after the Kominform resolution in Bucharest (June 1948) among the views of the British Foreign Office, they only became fully occupied with this question from 1949 on, as a result of the...

Teljes leírás

Elmentve itt :
Bibliográfiai részletek
Szerző: Vukman Péter
Dokumentumtípus: Könyv része
Megjelent: JATEPress Szeged 2009
Sorozat:Bölcsészműhely
Bölcsészműhely, 2008
Kulcsszavak:Szovjetunió története - 1948-1953, Jugoszlávia története - 1948-1953
Tárgyszavak:
Online Access:http://acta.bibl.u-szeged.hu/75729
Leíró adatok
Tartalmi kivonat:Although the hypothetical possibility of Soviet and/or satellite military attack against Yugoslavia first emerged after the Kominform resolution in Bucharest (June 1948) among the views of the British Foreign Office, they only became fully occupied with this question from 1949 on, as a result of the ever increasing border incidents, the Soviet note of 18 August 1949, which was considered as an ultimatum by the Yugoslav leaders, and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The analyses did not exclude the possibility of a direct military attack, they only took it into consideration as the last possibility, in case the Soviet Union would have risked the outbreak of World War III, or would have wanted to save her prestige in Eastern Europe because of the protraction of the Korean War. From 1950 on, the analyses foresaw four possibilities regarding the Soviet Union: „wait and see" strategy, organising internal revolts, guerilla warfare and direct military attack, which was considered to be the least probable, even if numerous ambassadors and military attachés analysed the process and the consequences of this possibility, sometimes contradicting each other. The question of military attack against Yugoslavia was on the agenda during Foreign Secretary Eden's visit in Yugoslavia in 1952 and Tito's visit in London in March 1953, yet no change occurred in its judgement. On the one hand, Yugoslavia was interested in keeping the question on the agenda of discussions with Western leaders as she wanted the obtain Western military help. On the other hand, the Foreign Office estimated no change in Soviet foreign policy after Stalin's death, and therefore, they didn't consider the military attack against Yugoslavia real, but they did make an effort to integrate her into their own defence system.
Terjedelem/Fizikai jellemzők:13-22
ISSN:1789-0810