A törvényesség és az alkotmány kategóriái az állambiztonság fogalomkörében 1989 /
The monolithic structure of power suspends all public political discussions and prohibits the development and articulation of alternatives. The ruling elite cannot tolerate the public sphere in any form. The one-party system is a dictatorial form of domination which could function equally well witho...
Elmentve itt :
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| Dokumentumtípus: | Cikk |
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Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Karának tudományos bizottsága
Szeged
2010
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| Sorozat: | Acta Universitatis Szegediensis : acta juridica et politica
73 No. 1-64 |
| Kulcsszavak: | Államvédelem - Magyarország - 1989 |
| Tárgyszavak: | |
| Online Access: | http://acta.bibl.u-szeged.hu/7477 |
| Tartalmi kivonat: | The monolithic structure of power suspends all public political discussions and prohibits the development and articulation of alternatives. The ruling elite cannot tolerate the public sphere in any form. The one-party system is a dictatorial form of domination which could function equally well without a party. Party and state organs cannot be differentiated at any level of the hierarchy of power. The unity of economic, political, ideological and legal power gives rise to the system's totalitarian character. Even when the system functions relatively „well" and no direct political terror is apparent, it nevertheless remains totalitarian, for there is no sphere of daily life void of political significance..The power apparatus is likewise incapable of generating a persuasive social theory because proletarian dictatorship has kept none of the promises made by its legitimating ideology. In the latter part of its long rule the political elit managed to turn Hungary into the most cheerful prison block behind the Iron Curtain. But — since „existing" socialism (in contradiction with the declared theories) was functioning as a bureaucratic dictatorial regime — it was incapable of meeting the demands of formal democracy. At the same time these typical elements — inconsistent with the generally known conception — did not originate from the political system or from one-party tyranny. In fact the party-ruled state was established and maintained; in reality, by the fact that these societies throughout their existence, remained on a harsh-communistic level (in the Marxist sense of the word) and were also having to cope with grave legitimacy problems. In the late 1980s, Hungary's 15,000 member Security Police was controlled by the Ministry of Interior. The reform of the political system during the second half of the 1980s appeared to have also affected the Security Police. In an interview in July 1989, Minister of Interior Horvath claimed that the Security Police no longer viewed the domestic opposition as political enemies, an image that had become "obsolete" in a multiparty system. He condemned previous Security Police actions, such as harassing and detaining known dissidents before national holidays as "a bad reflex action of a different type of power structure." Horvath stressed that the Security Police did have a legitimate intelligence and counterintelligence function but was not an organization "placed above the citizens". One of the most important question of power was how to determine the new structure and tasks of political police in the period of transition and later. Several different concepts were created by the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party, the opposition, even, the State Security Service for recreation of political police. Karoly Grosz, general secretary of the party, had planned, at the beginning of 1989, to use the control of the armed forces and security apparatus he still had then, to decree a state of emergency, expecting the Central Committee to go with the tide and endorse a fait accompli. The objective would not, of course, have been to establish a permanent political-military dictatorship but to realign the balance of forces in favor of the Party, in order to negotiate the conditions of a return to normalcy and the gradual introduction of pluralist elements with the opposition. The Political Reconciliation Talk defined a special topic to discuss: creating legal guarantees for preventing recourse to solutions based on the use of force. At the end of negotiations the Agreement declared: the suspension of coercive police measures for the duration of the transition period is an important trust-building measure, moreover expert committees should endeavor to reach agreement on issues concerning the transformation of the Worker's Militia. As part of the change, the position, role and future tasks of the security services had to be defined. Previously the so called state security work in Hungary was carried out on the basis of low level secret regulations, which severely limited basic human rights laid down in the Constitution. The most important act was the enactment of the new, modified constitution by parliament. Hungary thus became a republic, without a preamble. The constitution guaranteed the rights of citizens, protected the multi-party system with guarantees, prohibited the establishment of central control and the monopoly of power by any single party. Even, the professional members of the Hungarian Defence Forces, the Police and the national security services may not be members of political parties and may not engage in political activities. Despite the relatively strong success in implementing a democratic system, market economy in 1989, the transformation of its intelligence agencies was incomplete. The intelligence organizations holds fast to the old concept of an oversized, hyper bureaucratic intelligence system. The system itself has been changing but not at the adequate speed and to some extent, it has kept the baggage of its past. Meanwhile their reference to legality and constitutionalism was an everyday phrase. The sudden collaption of State Security Service — the 3rd Main Directorate of Ministry of Internal Affairs — in consequence of so-called Duna-gate—skandal has been rapidly created a new Act on National Security Office. No law has ever stipulated the legal framework of intelligence activity since the Act came to life. Only transitory regulations, commands and orders existed specifying the scope of activity, while there was no law explicitly expressing the constitutionality of a democratic state. As a result of the accurate and purposeful specification of the organizational structure, operational regulations, sphere of authority and responsibility, the very conditions for a more effective professional work have been created. Not only the secret services of dictatorship are judged to be guilty by the moral sense but every ideology, means and method which, either legally but mostly illegally, encroaches upon the privacy, putting the citizen at the mercy of an invisible power, and which, where it cannot condemn in a court, slanders and discredits, breaks careers, and radically interferes in lives. |
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| Terjedelem/Fizikai jellemzők: | 751-781 |
| ISSN: | 0324-6523 |