"Tanulj meg mindenkitől tanulni" alkotmánybíráskodás a Tajvani-szoros két oldalán /
The study intends to outline the development and functioning of the constitutional review in China, with an emphasis on the current constitutional solution in the People’s Republic of China. It is argued that even though the Western concepts of separation of powers and rule of law were unknown in im...
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| Dokumentumtípus: | Könyv része |
| Megjelent: |
2013
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| Sorozat: | Szegedi Jogász Doktorandusz Konferenciák
2 Az új alaptörvény és a jogélet reformja 2 |
| Kulcsszavak: | Alkotmányjog - Tajvan, Alkotmánybíráskodás - Tajvan |
| Tárgyszavak: | |
| Online Access: | http://acta.bibl.u-szeged.hu/71297 |
| Tartalmi kivonat: | The study intends to outline the development and functioning of the constitutional review in China, with an emphasis on the current constitutional solution in the People’s Republic of China. It is argued that even though the Western concepts of separation of powers and rule of law were unknown in imperial China, some theoretical and practical arrangements did exist to form a system of checks and balances. Some of these arrangements continued to influence the constitutional thinking in the republican and post-republican period. The Republic of China managed to develop a unique system of separation of powers as regards the political and governmental powers as well as several branches within the governmental power. In practice, this arrangement enabled the emergence of a full-fledged centralised system of constitutional review on Taiwan – but only after decades of inactivity. On the other hand, the People’ Republic of China rejects the separation of governmental powers, and tries to put into practice a limited review system in the framework of the National People’s Congress. It is argued that such an arrangement primarily serves as a control facility over local legislative and executive organs, and is ill equipped to deal with constitutional complaints of individuals. There is a lively discussion in the PRC over different options to improve the current institutional setup; however, the most likely outcome of these debates will be only incremental procedural adjustments. As a conclusion, it is argued that – regardless of the actual institutional arrangements – constitutional review will remain dysfunctional, if there exists a political power independent from governmental powers that can directly or indirectly impose its their will on all State actors. The experience of the PRC also shows that a limited review system within the central legislative is very difficult to activate. As far as the ROC (Taiwan) experience is concerned, it seems that the existence of an independent constitutional review body is not a sufficient indicator of the quality of constitutionalism in a given entity on its own. However, an existing body may serve as a catalyst of transition by developing and maintaining an institutional and conceptual basis of constitutional review, that can be gradually activated once political circumstances allow to do so. |
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| Terjedelem/Fizikai jellemzők: | 67-79 |
| ISBN: | 978-963-306-142-8 |
| ISSN: | 2063-3807 |