Az akaratszabadság kérdésének büntetőjogi jelentősége
As that is presented in the study, the problem of free will (whether we have it or not) is a universal question, which affects numerous fields of life, therefore it is relevant from the point of criminal law as well. Our current knowledge about it points in the way that the concept (and the subjecti...
Elmentve itt :
| Szerző: | |
|---|---|
| Dokumentumtípus: | Cikk |
| Megjelent: |
2019
|
| Sorozat: | Acta Universitatis Szegediensis : forum : publicationes discipulorum iurisprudentiae
2 |
| Kulcsszavak: | Büntetőjog |
| Tárgyszavak: | |
| Online Access: | http://acta.bibl.u-szeged.hu/70862 |
| Tartalmi kivonat: | As that is presented in the study, the problem of free will (whether we have it or not) is a universal question, which affects numerous fields of life, therefore it is relevant from the point of criminal law as well. Our current knowledge about it points in the way that the concept (and the subjective feeling) that we possess it, is merely an illusion (however, this can not be stated with certainty). In any case, the question arises: what changes does the determinist concept (which says that we do not have free will) implies in regard to the dogmatic system of criminal substantive law? I attempted to revise the concept of delict elaborated by the scholars of the University of Szeged in the previous decades. I came to the conclusion that (if it is necessary) we can modify the dogmatic system in a way that does not destroy the fundamentals of its current state. |
|---|---|
| Terjedelem/Fizikai jellemzők: | 71-100 |
| ISSN: | 2560-2802 |